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TWO BASIC CONCEPTIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM
BERNARD

CIIECHTERMAN

University of Miami
Introdu ction
A recurring theme in the contemporary literature of international politic s
and foreign policy analysis concerns itse lf with attempts to identify th e curr nt
and futur e tatus of systemic politic in the world arena. Th e pr evailing view
see the international political syst m (IP ) of the pr esen t and the immediat e
pastonth verg ofbreakupandreplac
m ntbyan ewo ne. taminimumthe
iew i that a major realignment is in the offering. To determine the accuracy
of such an assertion i provocation enough to engage in some form of analysi of
today's IPS and its apparent trends . It is al o my contention that such an
xploration will reward the student with a significant insight and persp ctive
on th natur of the IPS , a nece ssary objective in its own right.
In s eking to id ntify the curr nt and future status of the IPS , the investigator is invariably confronted by th exist nee of two fundam ntally
dichotomous conceptions of the natur e of th system: a Hobbe sian and a
Lockean. This discovery in itself is important as a consid ration for analyzing
any gen ral a sertion as to the chang s in the old and emergenc of a n w
IP . How much of any of th e conclusions are attributable to th bias ofone of
th se vi ws rather than a careful accumulation, analysis and validating of data
about th IP ?
There are of course a multiplicity of conceptions of the IP , but they all
deriv their in piration from the two basic views cited. The two views,
regardless of the nomenclatur e e mplo ed, have time-immemorial in flu need
the cl scriptions, analy es, and prescriptions offered by academicians and
public officials for the IPS . The con eptualizations have b n employed
som time consciously, sometimes unconsciously , and sometimes only on the
basis of a partial awareness, even by methodologically-oriented p op! . Driven to their respective extreme they b come irreconcilable; offered in carefully qualified fa hion th re emerges some similarities and areas of ov rlap .
Each conception has been the product of considerab le intellectualizing and/or
emotionalism, the distinction between the supporting efforts frequently lost
due to the inten ity of ubsequent personal commitment.
Th e Dichotomoits Conc eption s of th e JPS: A Hobb esian View
To facilitate the identification ofth Hobbesian View, it should be thought
of as synonymous with "ordered Anarchy ." The term is intended to conv ya
position on an IPS continuum as predominantly anarchic but subject to
ongoing efforts to organize and stabilize the world, including ome successful
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past achievements. The invocation of Hobbes' name is somewhat misleading
unless identification is made with his classical concept of the "state of war" in
his writings. The reference here avoids Hobbes' ultimate solution, "absolutism," to achieve stability in public relationships. The contemporary
Hobbesian excerpts the "state of war" aspect, stressing by analogy the fundamental shortcomings and inherent limitations of man's nature as fostering a
permanent, ongoing social conflict in all human relationships. This assumption in turn becomes an underlying premise for further development of the
Hobbesian conception of the IPS.
Human frailty, the starting point for theorizing, is usually inferred , compelling a reader to discern this suppositional thread appearing throughout the
conceptualization. Those Hobbesians 1 who begin with an outspoken admission of their "human nature theory" have consistently attracted the interested
student's attention as a basis for serious intellectual endeavor, whether for
reasons of agreement or disagreement.
In addition to the fundamental causality attributed to the nature of man,
the Hobbesian also focuses on the vagaries and uncertainties inhering in the
IPS as well as the internal dynamics of individual societies that are linked to
external behavior. It is these assumptions and systemic features that preoccupy Hobbesians in every day analysis and are used to validate their overview.
In recent history the Hobbesian View has been identified with "Realism"
as an interpretation of international politics. In the writings of advocates -;nd
critics, synonyms such as "realpolitik, machtpolitik, power politics, Biblical
realism, etc.," have been employed to characterize the viewpoints as well as to
convey the central concepts. Students of the IPS must recognize that
similarities among such views does not guarantee that each one truly represents a Hobbesian View. Too often they may reflect distorted variations
derived from that basic conception. 2
In an American context, the Hobbesian View has been the exceptional
.rather than the predominant interpretation of the IPS. Any overview of the
intellectual traditions that have governed American thinking about the IPS
evidence an overwhelming commitment to the alternative Lockean View.
Aside from those moments of attentiveness shown "the founding fathers"
(most particularly Alexander Hamilton), some influential advocates at the tum
of the 19th-20th centuries (Mahan, T. Roosevelt), and some writers and
policy-makers of the immediate post-World War Two period (Niebuhr, Kennan, Morgenthau, etc.), the Hobbesian View has held little sway in American
behavior. Of course a prominent foreign affairs commentator, Walter
Lippmann, sought to provide an ongoing dialogue for this view throughout
20th Century America. Significantly, the previously cited moments of Hobbesian influence coincide with an intense and broad American activism in the
1 Niebuhr

, Morgenthau , Kennan , Lefever, etc.
Especially is this true for the view labelled "protracted conflict , .. a form of deterministic or
Lockean idealism popularly called "romantic conservatism.'"
2
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IPS. The multifaceted activism spurred on by th e Hobbe ians has never
precluded some specific forms of activism inspired by the Lockean View,
incorporating them in their overall conception of the IPS.
The Hobbesian View of the contemporary IPS can be briefly summarized
in terms of five attributes, their corollary dynamics and ramifications. Simply
stated they are: 1) the absence of any central governance; 2) a multiplicity of
goals sought by the participants and best fulfilled by a general strategy (see #
5); 3) the prevalency and continuity of heterogeneity among the participants ;
4) a multiplicity of strategies and techniques available to participants to
achieve their goals; and 5) a reliance on "eq uilibrium politics " as the best
control system (strat egy) by which to attain and sustain goal fulfillment in the
IPS .
By the absence of any central governance the Hobbesian describes on the
one hand the non-existence of a single, world-wide authoritative, legitimate
decision-making and enforcing body in th e IPS . By contrast, the Hobbesian
describes the situation of innumerable centers of authority as proof of a
dec entralized governance system. The lack of a single authority to foster and
compel obedience has the effect of only guaranteeing eac h state's command
over their own internal policy-making process and simultaneously denying
them absolute control over external behavior beyond their immediate jurisdiction.
The variety of actors, combinations, and recombinations occurring and
possible in any IPS varies with different periods of history , although one actor
form predominates with consistency as the key unit for explaining behavior
over any extended period of time. For past historical eras central dominant
actors have been clans , tribal units , city-states, or other types of principalities .
The contemporary Hobbesian cites "the territorial state" as the most significant actor today and for the foreseeable future. Recognizing that novel actor
formation is always occurring in an existing IPS supports the contention that
there are varieties of participants and that the JPS is always in a state of flux (or
potential transformation ).
The contemporary IPS is described by an elaborate typology of actors
dominated by the most numerous form , the territorial state, commonly referred to as the "nation-state." The current IPS is usually anointed by the title of
"the western nation-state system" because of its European-based origin in the
17th-18th centuries. Because of the fewness in number of actual nation-states
in the world today , meaning a coincidence of a national identity conscious
population with a distinct geographical territory , the unit represents more of
an aspirational goal than reality for the states in the IPS . The appropriate term
under these circumstances is the legal or political developmental status term
"the territorial state."
The current IPS also includes other actors such as "sub-national units,"
"regional or supranational units," " coalitions or alliances,"" dependent areas,"
and intergovernmental organizations (IGO 's).
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The Hobbesian usually differentiates
between the authoritativelegptimizing segments of the population as the true functionaries in the IPS in
contrast with the larger and more passive general populace. For the Hobbesian , all the earlier versions of the IPS were featured by an emphatically rigid
separation between leaders and the public in external role-playing. In the
current JPS , though accepting the gap as still pronounced for the great
majority of states, the influence of the public has risen to a new prominence.
The public now provides the "tolerable limits " beyond which policy-makers
may not stray , or they face the consequences of either being toppled from rule
or with the reduced prospects of an effective implementation of their policy
choices. Past Hobbesians are prone to lament over the rise of the common
man , whereas contemporists merely caution against any excessive reliance on
public opinion as a factor compounding the difficulties of rational policymaking , producing an emotional roller coaster effect on external behavior .
With the presence of so many actors , the Hobbesian cites the ad infinitum
number of relationships that do or can potentially exist, negating the prospects
of conclusive calculations and choices . At any given moment the actor is
engaged in bilateral , multilateral , hierarchical, committal, and transitory
relationships, as well as being confronted by the alternative possibilities
provided by each of these.
A ramification of the open-endedness of the JPS produces a consistent
insecurity for each actor , compelling them to focus on the inexactness of
payoffs regardless of what policies are adopted vis-a-vis others. Under these
uncertainties, a "worst case " frame of analysis is adopted for each relationship ,
dictating overly cautious behavior, primarily self-reliance, and great skepticism about the prospects of momentous changes in the IPS. The preoccupation with flux conditions and inability to predict developments in the JPS
produces the moral imperative to preserve the actor at all costs , a criterion by
which all subsequent behavior is then judged. With this basic concern underlying all prescriptive policies, the actor must engage in a constant competitive
struggle in all areas of human behavior to maximize survival. Survival is
viewed as more likely when predominantly self-reliant as opposed to being
dependent on other actors, although the latter remains a tactical option under
negative IPS circumstances.
In developing the second attribute of the IPS , the Hobbesian views the
numerous actors as expressive of a tremendous variety of goals that further
condition and determine their very survival. Nationalism is accepted as the
primary driving force to create and sustain actors. Other "cultural support"
bases for actor formation have severely limited prospects for replacing what
has been viewed the key energy force for 300 years in western societies and is
being emulated today in the non-western world. For the Hobbesian the
failure of this dominant loyalty-authority pattern to meet the needs of the
actors would lead to a new "cultural support" base , and probably organiza-
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tional basis, to fulfill satisfactions. This view would sustain the Hobbesian
belief in the open-ended condition of the IPS and the abilities to transform
itself as necessity demands. For the foreseeable future the Hobbesian does
not anticipate any departure from the present dominance of the territorial
state unit. The reasoning is based on 1) the paradoxical nature of nationalism
serving simultaneously as a unifying force (at the territorial level ) and a
fragmenting force (within the territorial level and in external interactions),
and 2) the need for nationalism to run its course as a fulfilled aspiration in the
more numerous "developing nations " of the world which currently lack its
pervasive impact , especially analogous to the older actors.
Despite a lack of uniformities among actors the essentialness of meeting a
vast number of needs creates a condition of interdependency for everyone
with at least someone else. Therefore actor behavior has a penetrating or
impinging effect on the internal affairs of other participants in the IPS. This
tendency , in the final analysis , denies any actor a realistic choice of decisionmaking in terms of purely domestic considerations.
A further consequential outgrowth of this actor interdependency is an
awareness that the very factors supporting their creation and survival are
simultaneously sources of their vulnerabilities vis-a-vis one another. To
adequately meet the actor 's goals demands his perception of changing needs
and priorities produced by both domestic and external factors , as well as a
constant resort to multifaceted domestic and external managerial and collaborative efforts. Mismanagement of internalities in the society could undermine the unity and support of the public or cause the authorities grave
concern that another actor might favorably exploit them to his advantage in
their relationships . To the Hobbesian it is evident that a unified society stands
a bette~ chance of successfully conducting its external relations as well as
buffering itself against any outside penetrations. It is equally obvious that for a
divided society the dangers on both these counts increases immeasurably up
to the ultimate prospect of complete subversion of the entire state. Failure to
comprehend this whole situation would negate the prospects of an actor
reaching his goals or even worse, injuring his security prospects .
To the Hobbesian the fallible and dual nature of men fails to guarantee
either a correct or absolute perception of their needs , thereby intensifying
their insecurities in externally-directed behavior. Internalities being diverse
in number and possibly misperceived, forces the actor a) to pursue cautious
and delimited external behavior to avoid damaging greatly the internal needs ,
b) not to resort to the wrong techniques for their policy implementations, and
c) to avoid incorrect commitments abroad. Considerable risk-taking and an
overly optimistic view of outcomes in the IPS suffer as a result of these
considerations.
In explaining the third attribute of the current IPS, the Hobbesian asserts
the primacy of a "cultural relativistic world." The external heterogeneity of
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actors reflects the significance of nationalism or parochialisms as the key factor
producing unit differentiation in the IPS. Because nationalism is based on a
combination of distinct historical, psychic and geographic factors , it produces
a consciousness and behavior pattern for territorial states biased in behalf of
these internalities. Effective leadership within each territory must cope with
the chauvinistic overtones of this phenomenon by attempting to channel or
control it for success in external relations. The best tactic seems to be a
lip-service acquiescence while modifying it to accord with needs and systemic
circumstances in the IPS that contradict its exclusive concern. The Hobbesian
ends up stressing the critical nature of internal dynamics, governmental and
cultural, as setting the tolerable limits for any leadership, but also a cause and
sustaining factor in interstate conflict in•the IPS.
A critical ramification of the heterogeneous nature of the external world is
that its pervasiveness, paramountcy, and continuity, must serve as the starting point in the state's efforts at foreign policy analysis and choices. An equally
important corollary must be the actor's recognition of the unresolvability of
state differences in any absolute sense. Accommodations, agreements , and
solutions are accepted as temporary at best, subject to considerable fluctuations caused by changing internalities and externalities. Differences persist
because of cultural and physical distinctions as well as inherent shortcomings
and limitations of actors. The Hobbesian concludes that conflictual behavior
flows from these fundamental factors as well as consequential misperceptions ,
inadequate responses, communication breakdowns, and calculated or deliberate contradictory behavior by actors.
A fourth essential ingredient of the contemporary conception of the IPS
recognizes the availability of a multiplicity of strategies and techniques by
which actors may achieve their goals. Every aspect of human endeavor is
viewed as a basis for interaction and interpenetration by one actor of another
to induce favorable results. The Hobbesian supports this likelihood by citing
the .typological similarities of internalities, that is physical and human resource capabilities and of "will." While varying from actor to actor in their
specifics, ultimately they are the calculated bases for broad strategy formation
and choices of technique in implementing external policies. This view is
adopted whether initiating, altering, or sustaining an existing relationship.
The classification scheme for both strategies and techniques may vary from
one Hobbesian to another, but they generally agree as to distinguishable
categories such as political, economic, psychological, ideological, legal, military, and cultural factors. Classification efforts do prove that considerable
standardization exists and is so accepted by the actors in the IPS. However,
standardization in the long run is subject to change reflecting the dynamic
qualities of the factors. The revision of previous typologies of strategies and
techniques is either due to deliberateness or the uncertainties of actors
operating in the IPS. Current examples include the deliberate misuse of
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semantical commonalities to gain at the expense of other actors, or the dubiety
over the strategic ramifications that flow from changes in the nuclear delivery
technology . Variations and new emphases in strategies and techniques
employed are constantly dep endent upon a variety of inputs , resource
capabilities and leve ls of will, available. Actors on both sides of any continuum
of " have" and "have not " capabi liti es must adjust their strategies and
techniques according to these prevailing circumstances.
Since strategy formation and techniqu e utilization are dependent on
capabilities available to the actor, they seek to maximize capability development in order to enhance their range offlexible choices and effectiveness with
regard to goal attainment.
o actor, according to the Hobbesian , ever possesses a sufficient reservoir of capabilities to facilitate any strategy it wants. Each
actor stands in a relative or delimited position of capabilities vis-a-vis other
actors, dictating a need to ascertain their respective differences and what
strategies and techniques are most feasible under these circumstances. Genera lly the Hobbesian insists that the actor with the greater relative capabilities
is in a superior position to influence and/or achieve its objectives. Historical
record has demonstrated the reverse is equally true .
The Hobbesian admits that throughout the course of history there have
been misperceptions by actors. Efforts to go beyond an actor's capabi lities, a
strategy of bluff, usually lead to poor results because someone always refuses
to submit to such chicanery. Unconscious behavior that leads to errors are
attributed to the inherent shortcomings of man or a lack of awareness. Although not assuredly resulting in the devastation of the actor, persistent errors
in calculations and policy choices, have a damaging impact on the security
and/or relative independence of actors. To the Hobbesian , fluidity in the
typology of influential factors and their relative impact in the IPS , force the
actor to exercise a constant vigilance and reaction pattern to enhance or even
sustain their very existence. Attempts to rigidify strategies or techniques as
permanent , or to disregard them altogether, have usually led to the downfall
of actors in history.
From the Hobbesian perspective the most extreme technique available for
use is organized violence, the ttftima ratio , commonly referred to as military
power. Existing military power can be employed either as a threat or as an
operationalized technique to achieve specific objectives vis-a-vis another
actor. Its very existence, proper deployment , plus the "will" to employ
military power , has the paradoxical effect of bringing about its nonutilization
or at worst a minimal application in an interacting relationship. The "will" to
employ such capability is critical and is commonly conceived of as conveying
the image of"credibility." Without it the greatest collection of military might
is rather meaningless. If employed intelligently in conjunction with other
techniques , or as the ultimate backup to the more pacific techniques , the
Hobbesian anticipates less dysfunctions and breakdowns in the IPS.
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The overriding shortcomings of men and actors make total avoidance of
contradictions or breakdowns inconceivable . Because the variety of possibilities range from minor contradictions to major breakdowns among actors,
military capabilities must be equal to each task. Survival as well as helping
reconstitute new security relationships are at stake. The Hobbesian insists on
the use of a delimited and calculated organized violence only in behalf of the
security objective in the IPS. This consistent awareness is also emphasized to
avoid misconstruing the technique as an end instead of as a means towards
achieving security in the IPS. The increased concern with organized violence,
due to the growth of its destructiveness , reenforces the Hobbesian insistence
on its proper management and the appreciation of its concurrent limitations.
The maximum form of violence, nuclear warfare, is viewed as having considerable limitations because of its inherent destructiveness and prevailing spatial cond itions between actors. Despite this , the Hobbesian in recognizing
technological change as the basic law of life, refuses to absolutize this as a
permanent situation for the contemporary IPS. Some writers insist that the
nuclear era is but in its infancy as of now.
Although actors desire to preoccupy themselves with one particular
technique or strategy, usually military or economic, the Hobbesian critiques
this overre liance severely. Individual man and the actors are viewed as having
innumerable needs which correctly perceived militate against such singular
dependency or outlook. Successful participation in the JPS requires th e actor
to operate on the basis of multiple techniques and strategies. All are interre lated on a continuum permitting optional choices, momentary emphases,
combinations, and intensities of application.
The Hnal ingredient of the Hobbesian conception of an IPS is for the actors
to rely on "equilibrium politics" as the best management strategy to attain and
sustain goal fulfillment. The key goal of any actor, prerequisite to any other, is
the maximization of security, a relative and dynamic rather than an absolute
posture. Security becomes synonymous with such conditions as survival,
continuity, independence , internal sovereignty, or the preservation of one's
own decision-making abilities. Additional actor objectives, specifically intended to meet particular needs, can only be met in the course of or after the
fulfillment of the priority goal of security. The Hobbesian rules out any
particularistic approach, such as invoking moral or legal precepts , at organizing and contro lling the IPS as inadequate to the comp lexities, diversities , and
uncertainties in international relationships .
Equilibrium politics , traditionally labelled "balance of power politics, " for
the Hobbesian means a calculated perception and deliberate management of
all change variables that affect actors at the local, regional, and universal
geographical levels of interaction . By resorting to a judicious concern and
selection of techniques and strategies under the fluctuating conditions of the
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IPS , an approximate equilibdum of actors at each le el of int raction should
ensue . Since actors are oriented towards a maximization of security , scalatory
efforts by one must be met by an equal re ·pons from the other to preserve the
equilibdum . Because of restraints built into sy t mic circumstances and the
inherent limitations on the capabilities of every actor , the prospect for standoffs or deescalation of specific activities are always present, as long as the end
result is th retention of an equilibrium .
Approximate equilibrium in the IPS is identified by the Hobb sian with
maximum actor control over ev nts and a diminution of conflictual r lation
and its prospects. While never precluding reduced numbers and minor lev I
of conflict , equilibrium politics negates the chance of a major conflagration as
long as th equilibrium is consciously sustained. Th contemporary Hobbesian , in contrast with earlier exponents , stresses that equilibrium cannot be
attained or sustained as an automatic process or as some natural tendency at
work in th universe. Ongoing positive commitment and choice is necessary
to both achieve and sustain th balan e.
Actual equilibrium formation and pres rvation can occur by such formal
means as negotiations , or by such tacit means as unilateral inducements to
obtain a qLtid pro quo response, or any combination of the two. Failure by
actors to follow the prescriptions laid down by the Hobbesians I ads to
"dis quilibrium ." This alternative condition becomes synonymous with gross
conflictual behavior , multiplying instabilities , manifest insecurities, decline
and eventual subordination by one actor of another. It is within the realm of
choice of an actor to opt for a non-cooperative course of action or to veto others
se king to create an equilibrium. When an approximate equilibrium already
exi 'ts, non- ooperation then becomes a form of deviant behavior. Efforts to
prevent the emergen e of an equilibrium in the first place are also labelled
cl viant behavior. Usually such activities are associated with hegemonic aspirations of an actor, which requires a response of equal or superior proportions
by other actors to keep the threat to equilibrium in check. Where there is
failure to react to such threats in time or adequately, then a superordinationsubordination pattern emerges between the actors. Hierarchical patt ms vary
greatly becaus of the vari ty oft chniques that can be employed to achieve
this relationship. Territorial occupation and governance by an outside actor is
usually the most extreme version of such a subjugation. However it is not the
automatic choice because the determination as to the most efficient ubordination pattern rests with the actor engaged in the subjugating function.
Hierarchical patterns between various actors in the IPS are not avoidable.
At any given moment the discrepanci s b twe n actors in terms of capabilities
can be at great variance. Und rstood by the weaker actors as part of their
capability calculation, it propels them into coalitions to enhance their ecurity. Even voluntary membership in a coalition can mean a hierarchical
pattern for the weaker actor. However , since equilibdum is dependent on all

TWO BASIC CONCEPTIO

S OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITI CAL SYSTEM

101

its parts , even the weakest actor in a coalition has som e lev e rage vis-a -vis the
strongest actor. Voluntary association means the subordinated actor can disassociate at opportune moments to join some other coalition to recreate the
equilibrium in a somewhat different form. In these circumstances, the weak e r
as well as the stronger actors , tend to agree that their vital interest in security
based on a coalition serves as the best means to attain and sustain equilibrium .

The Dichotomous Conceptions of the IPS:Th e Lockean View
The other fundamental conception of the IPS , the Lockean View , can best
be characterized as "Order in Search of More Order. " The underlying reasoning determining such a terminology is that on a continuum classification the
IPS is currently accepted as predominantly organized . Though not totally void
of anarchic tendencies, the Lockeans believe the IPS is moving towards more
complete and effective organization. Additional and novel ordering efforts are
conceived of as both likely and increasingly successful. This movement does
not preclude setbacks, but they are viewed as temporary occurrences since
the overall progressive development of the JPS is well established , if not
irreversible.
The invocation of Locke 's name is somewhat misleading because in normative political philosophy he ultimately accepts the imperfections of men in
their relationships. Locke is therefore employed in this essay to denote one
critical aspect of his political philosophy - his social contract theory is
identified with the calculated ability of men to undertake and consummate
orderly arrangements to control their relationships. Among the JPS theorists
influenced by this viewpoint the emphases are on the growing integrative and
cooperative relations between interacting actors transcending their internal
jurisdictions . Usually the Lockean View is applied to the internal dynamics of
a society, but the exponents have always felt it was equally applicable to the
IPS , especially because of their acceptance of the linkage of intemalities and
externalities.
The Lockean View focuses on the ability of men to resolve their conflictual
relationships, or at least to diminish them to a point of minor consequence in
the total spectrum of human relations. Hobbesian concepts such as anarchy ,
primacy of flux, ungovernable by institutions, continuing contradictions, etc. ,
are unacceptable to their version of the JPS. This is largely attributable to a
very optimistic conception of human nature - fundamentally or potentially
rationalistic and as a consequence permitting highly cooperative behavior. In
the Lockean View the present and future IPS, while evidencing continuity in
many particulars, will eventually be radically different from the past.
In contemporary analysis the Lockean View is more readily identified with
"idealism " as an interpretation ofintemational politics. In the various writings
of specialists, supporters and critics , synonyms such as " moralists, legalists ,
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functionalists futurists , etc ., " 3 have been employed to identify this viewpoint
for the student of the IPS. As noted earlier, in regards to the Hobbesians,
readers should be aware that similarities in such views do not necessarily or
adequately depict the Lockean View. Variations derived from the Lockean
View of the IPS abound in current literature. 4 These exponents demand very
careful scrutinization to avoid misconceptions about the core position of the
Lockean View.
In the American context , the Lockean View has dominated the intellectual
tradition of interpreting the IPS and foreign relations. It has been most
commonly found in the policies ofJeffersonians , Wilsonians , and the foreign
policies of the Roosevelt " ew Deal. " This has been true whether the reference points have been periods of activism or inactivism in American external
relations. The basic tenets of the Lockean View , as will be elaborated , have
been utilized to explain and justify the choice of these diametrically opposed
policy patterns for Americans or the world-at-large.
The Lockean View of the contemporary IPS is best summarized in terms of
three basic attributes , their corollary dynamics, and vita l ramifications: 1) an
increasing coincidence and awareness of self- and mutal interests between
actors ; 2) the growth of transnationalism and transactionalism as the major
patterns of international relationships ; and 3) the prevalency of and increasing
governance of international relationships.
The increasing growth of self-and mutual interests between the actors in
the IPS is attributed in the Lockean View to a combination of factors, essentially the technological and communication revolutions. The technological
revolution is recognized for both its intensification and acceleration of positive
content and multilateral impacts on the actors in the IPS. The communication
revolution , which is also seen in intensified and accelerated terms, is credited
with the new transnational consciousness of the actors.
either of these
developments is conceived of as novel in the history of the relationships of
men and their organized activities in any JPS. However , the Lockeans insist
that the impacts of both revolutionary factors has led to the more recent
triumph of the "necessity principle ," an indicator of a new urgency and
paramountcy in current human relationships. Actors are viewed as being at a
critical stage of interdependency that must foreclose anarchic and self-interest
policies as damaging to everyone in the IPS. Problem intensities confronting
actors have reached a frightening plateau that demands both their recognition
and multilateral universal responses oriented to serving everyone's common
needs. Particular focus is on the destructiveness of military and non-military
technology and the inadequate responses to the existing economic and social
interdependencies of the actors in the IPS. In the latter case the Lockeans
3

Mitrany , Falk , Mendlovitz, Overseas Development Council , etc .
Especially is this true for such views as neo -Marxism , ew Left revisionism , and
isolationism . These respective views are substantially different from the Lockean in their emphasis on "non -activism " in a nation's foreign policy behavior, espcially for the United States.
Their inward-directed orie ntation reflect a primacy of concern with radical or reform transformation of the society , despite its ramifications for the IPS .
4
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specifically refer to the dangerous population-resource ratios, the ecological
consequences of economic development, and the unstabilizing consequences
of the failure of the underdeveloped world's modernization revolution. Summarily the emphasis is on the dangers inhering for all in the "have not" nation
predicaments.
For the Lockean external and internal relationships are inextricably entwined. The fate and destiny of each actor is em bodied in each other's actions.
The distinction between internalities and externalities are to the Lockean an
artificial division since the domestic and international spheres are viewed as
one jurisdiction and concern. The social consciousness of the Lockeans is
epitomized in a paraphra e of Lincoln's famous remark "A world half deprived
cannot long endure."
For the Lockean the correct perception of the current trends in the IPS
would lead to the assertion that the Hobbesian prescriptions will not meet the
basic needs of the actors. A correct perception would encourage an everincreasing growth of transactional flows between the various actors. In tum
this would evolve into trusting relationships and an eventual convergence of
all interests and behavior. Such a convergence is understood by the Lockean
to be coidentical with the predominance of the cooperative spirit and a careful
delimitation of the acceptable modes for conducting any conflictual relationships. At a particular point in this development of convergence, never spelled
out by all Lockeans, the prospects of a major conflagration or a reversal of the
transnational integrative pattern would become impossible.
As part of the verification of the developments and expectations within the
IPS, the Lockeans devote considerable descriptive efforts to "the growth of
transnationalism and transactionalism as the major patterns in international
relationships." Although acknowledging such an evolution as evident time
immemorial in international relationships, the intensity and acceleration
taking place in today's IPS is heavily accentuated among the current Lockeans.
A variety of causal and explanatory factors are introduced to substantiate
these developments. The communication revolution not only makes peoples
aware of one another, but it serves as a basis of transmitting values that lead to
an acculturation process among the impacted peoples. Ultimately it results in
a universal recognition of commonly shared problems and similar solutions for
them. The technological revolution, as a dynamic in its own right, creates
common problems and offers similar opportunities and solutions for all the
actors. In addition to these two variables at work, there is also a cross-national
fertilization of views and values taking place because of the large transmigration of humanity over the entire globe. Out of this event comes a further
acculturation process whereby populations increasingly share and act out a
common value system. The three developments simultaneously complement
and reenforce one another in evolving the IPS in the direction anticipated by
the Lockeans.
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With the novel consciousness of populations , a whole new set of loyalti es
and authoritative decision-making centers emerge as central to the workings
of the IPS. Each problem , reflecting a transnational need as oppo ed to a
particular actor's n eds, generates organizations and leaders oriented to these
specific concerns. Some Lockeans envision a d velopmental progression ,
either actual and/or desirabl , citing a regional orientation as a prior tep
towards a full-scale universal orientation. Such distinctions as found among
Lockeans , while not undercutting their core concepts, indicate a range of
views exists. Th emergence and growth of the transnational-problemoriented organizations and leaders provides an additional mechanism for the
eventual socialization of p oples in the direction of the integrative developments .
The ultimate expectation of the Lockeans is that the evolving functional
areas, such as economic, social, technological, etc., will have a spillover effect
resulting in a political institutional integration pattern. The latter occurrence
would be viewed by the Lockeans as the culminating and most comprehensive
fulfillment of human relationships in the JPS.
It is in regards to the third basic attribute, the governance of international
politics , that the Lock ans expend their greatest effort. Reflective of their
optimistic outlook , the disposition towards futuristic expectations, and th
n ed to provide a better IPS, the Lockeans are uniformly preoccupied with
the blueprinting of "social contracts" that fulfill these anticipations. The
prevailing view is that the IPS is well organized, but lacking at pr sent in both
the scope and intensity of policies essential to a most efficient operation in
behalf of its affected populations. Empirical data are usually presented to
support the organized aspects of the present and imm diate past IPS . Most
particularly are they employed to support the Lockean contention of th
increasing progression towards the organization and governance of the IPS .
o less than five 5 "social contracts" are di cernible among Lockeans as
having been historically operationaliz d for the governance of the IP . All of
them are traceable backwards into the distant past , additional proof that a
progressive development towards an ultimate scenario has been taking place.
The five "social contracts," each expressive of a specific aspiration of men , are
linked in the Lockean View as either a pre-condition or complementary
reenforcement for one another. Therefore no priority is attached by the
Lockeans to any single social contract , although misguided dogmatists have
misled students of the IPS by their stress on one to the exclusion of the others.
They are all viewed as essential and contributory to the overall dynamic of the
increasing organization and governance of the IPS.
One of the social contracts is popularly referred to as "international law," a
system of rules on the rights and duties of states towards each other. Some
5
The number varies among Lockeans according to each ones emphases and analyses. Thus
the social contract labelled intergovernmental organizations (ICO 's) splits into a universal and/or
regional variation for different Lockeans. Similar examples exist for other social contracts.
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Lockeans trace the content from both the Roman concept of "ius gen ti um (the
law of the people )" and their adaptation of "ius naturale (the natural law)" from
th e Greeks. The more common starting point to demonstrate the lengthy
influence of modern day international law has been Hugo Grotius in the 17th
century.
More recently Lockeans have sought to expand the application of these
essential standards downward to govern the behavior of individuals . Some
Lockeans have accepted the best prospect for progressive development lies in
the prior evolution oflegal precepts based on regional cultural and geographical factors. The universal impulse has been reliant on the further growth of
international law through various complementary means such as: 1) the
United Nations ' International Law Commission; 2) law-making treaties ; 3)
adjudication and advisory opinions of the International Court ofJ ustice; 4) the
use of the equity concept of ex aequo et bona ; and 5) pacific settlement of
disputes. Success for this social contract has been based on the existence of
prior and evolving legal principles as the criteria for judging and controlling
actor behavior in the IPS.
A second social contract , exercising both a restraining influence as well as
promoting more governance of the IPS , can be labelled "international morality and world public opinion. " In the case of international morality, the
Lockeans focus on the growth and intensification of a consensus of ethical
values among the peoples of the world. The progressive development of a
mutuality of attitudes, beliefs and aspiratfons is attributed to the combined
communications-technological revolutions and other cross-national fertilization factors already mentioned. Because of their belief in a growing consensus
of values , a regional and/or universal consciousness merges which focusses on
the achievement of common goals. As a substantive development , the Lockeans perceive of the community idea as a precursor and/or reenforcer of
further institutional and legal principle formation while simultaneously creating criteria by which to judge and control activities in the IPS .
The closely related concept of "world public opinion " is viewed by Lockeans primarily as a restraining force on actor policies. Although recognizing
considerable diversities in public opinion on a daily basis, the Lockeans feel
that world public opinion has progressed to the point of indicating what is
intolerable as well as permissable by actors in the contemporary IPS. The
major vehicle for operationalizing world public opinion has become the
United Nations in general and the General Assembly and Secretary-General
specifically. The restraining dynamic is carried out by appeals to mass publics
over the heads of state or to selectively transnational and influential opinion
elites in each society. In these mechanics lies a Lockean recognition that there
is a vital linkage between the internal and external behavior of any actor.
A third social contract, reflecting the pervasiveness and increasing governance of the IPS , is the "arms control/disarmament movement. " To the
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Lockeans , history is replete with spasmodic and continuing efforts at both
general disarmament and control agreements. Although the ultimate inclination is towards total disarmament , elimination of all armed forces and arms ,
there has been considerable accommodation to a prerequisite step of arms
control , the partial reduction and/or stabilization of anns and force levels. It is
only by these means that human and physical resources are emancipated for
other Lockean expectatfons.
The Lockeans view the current period in history , the nuclear age , an
urgency unparalleled in previous times . While urging more rapid developments in a general disarmament , they emphasize the evolving arms control
progress as proof of this ultimate direction in the IPS. The progressive thesis of
the continuity and consistency of the arms control/disarmament movement
tends to begin with the Hague Conferences at the turn of the 19th-20th
centuries. Then they go on to insist that there has been an acceleration and
intensification of the movement since World War Two by citing a vast array of
specifics, especially in the nuclear weapons control field.
The fourth social contract , "intergovernmental organizations (IGO 's),"
have been particularly attractive to the "free world have nations " and the
"third-fourth world have-not nations. " Both groups have been optimistic as to
the possibilities of such an approach achieving increased improvement and
stability for the underdeveloped actors, a reg uirement for a better functioning
IPS .
The lengthy history of the "international public union movement ," the
modem version of which originated in the 19th century , has become a
world-wide economic and social functionalism movement in the post-World
War Two period. The Lockeans view functionalism and neo-functionalism as a
building-block process whereby cooperation in economic and social affairs
intensifies a community consciousness regionally and world-wide.
The functionalists stress the transnational nature of the economic and
social problems besetting the peoples of the IPS , thus demanding a coordinated and organized supranational attack on them to achieve effectiveness.
The · vehicle for this assault is the IGO , although there are also nongovernmental organizations engaged in a complementary effort. The creation
and further growth of the IGO's represents a progressive development towards a common horizontal problem resolution basic to all men , the growth of
habitual cooperation , and an increasing governance of relationships in the
IPS. Every aspect of human endeavor is viewed as vital and susceptible to
organization as well as cooperation. The cooperative spirit is assumed to have
transferability from one activity to another , including politics , producing an
accelerating impact in the IPS. The ultimate expectation is that these processes will lead to a political community consciousness and organization paralleling the horizontal economic and social activity patterns . For the Lockean the
final proof lies in the vast multiplication of regional and universal IGO' s
exercising an increasing jurisdiction over virtually every human activity .
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The fifth social contract takes the form of "collective security systems"
operating in the IPS. The basic requirements and expectations are that the
actors will join in a formal system, cooperate as a unified group in the face of a
potential or actual common danger of aggression, and thereby maximize their
individual security as the pay off. The formal aspect, a regional and/or univer sal organization, provides the actors the means to keep abreast of the current
or e merging dangers inhering in the IPS. It also affords the actors a continuous
decision-making and implementation apparatus to deal effectively with these
dangers. The actors are expected to subordinate their narrow self-interests to
an overriding group interest of preserving their mutual security. Prior commitments to this goal sets up a situation whereby the deviant actor would not
likely challenge the combined strengths of the group. In this situation the
collectivity becomes identifiable as the moral and legal will of the world
community, a powerful deterring force in the IPS . If an actor persists in
violating existing norms , the group via the organization's mechanics , activates
a coercive action against the aggressor to restore the status quo ante.
For the Lockean the collective security idea has been the major innovation
of the 20th century. Starting with the imperfect League of Nations, it has been
superseded by the United
ations, an improved and constantly evolving
version of the original idea. Optimism as to its growth and effectiveness are
derived from the additions of regional collective security systems. The subsequent techniques of "preventive diplomacy " and "peacekeeping operations " add to the vision of collective security as an adaptive and innovative
approach to increasing the governance of the IPS. The emergence of a
third-fourth world dominance in the United Nations as a whole and in the
General Assembly specifically generates the feeling that international standards, regulatory behavior , and diminished independence of Great Powers
are taking over the IPS. Continued application of collective security
mechanics is supposed to enhance habitual cooperation and the pacific format
for conducting the relationships between all peoples and nations in the IPS.
Conclusion
The author has deliberately avoided rendering a critique of these two basic
views of the IPS despite their vulnerabilities. The effort would require a
separate essay of equal or greater length. Much of the debate today in
academic and official circles really revolve around the strengths and weaknesses of these two views, usually activated by specific events and/or policy
choices. Too often the coherent aspects and the unstated assumptions are
missing in these debates. This essay has sought to close the gap by providing a
systematic, but brief overview, by which to follow and analyze such controversies. As part of this objective, a summa,y table is presented by which to
compare and contrast the respective views. Like all such efforts, it must resort
to oversimplifications.
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Sim ilariti es

l. Th e IP S is compri sed of a variety of nee ds th at pr odu ce a multiplicity of relationships,
possible and actu al.
2. Th e functional int e rdepend e nce of actors (or coalitions) links th e int e rnal-exte rnal behavior with oth e rs.
3. Fun ctional int erde pend e nce prec ludes the policy option of int e rnalization ofint ern alities
(isolationism).
4. Fun ctional int erdepend e nce and nee d fulfillment dict ates som e form of collaborativ e
activities .
5. Conflict in th e !PS is managea ble und er specific circumstances (which vary howeve r
be twee n th e two views) as a ze ro-sum game.
6. Techni ques of viole nce (milit ary particularly) in th e cont e mpora ry JPS are inh e re ntl y
delimit ed by their very techn ology and spatial appli cation s.
7. Failur e to instigate prop e r presc ripti ve be havior, althou gh diffe re nt for eac h concepti on
of the JP S, leads to a non-zero sum game , with syste mic breakdown and pess imistic pay offs.

